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 560 
Judicial Interference with 
Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 




Of all the rights that an accused person possesses, the 
right to counsel is by far the most important because it affects 
the ability to assert all other rights. A defendant‟s right to 
counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, has long been 
understood to include the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.1 However, the standard for “effective assistance” in 
defending a client is complex and controversial. In Strickland 
v. Washington,2 the Supreme Court set out the analytical 
framework for deciding claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. “The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness,” the Court said, “must be whether counsel‟s 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”3 Counsel‟s effectiveness can be 
impaired by both internal and external constraints. For 
example, a defendant‟s right to effective counsel can be violated 
because of counsel‟s own personal failings and mistakes. A 
lawyer who is drunk or sleeping during a trial may be unable 
to render effective advocacy.4 By the same token, a lawyer may 
be incapable of rendering effective assistance who is so 
professionally incompetent that his representation falls below 
the standard of objective reasonableness, which is the standard 
 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. 
1. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984). 
2. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n.14 (1970)). 
3. Id. at 686. 
4. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(presumption of prejudice based on counsel‟s sleeping during prosecution‟s 
presentation of scientific evidence in rape trial). 
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articulated by the Court in Strickland.5 However, even if 
counsel is professionally competent and not suffering from 
personal deficiencies that would impair sound representation, 
his ability to defend his client effectively may nevertheless be 
impeded by external factors that may affect counsel‟s advocacy 
in ways that violate both the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel and his Due Process right to a fair trial.6 
Probably the most damaging external impediment to a 
lawyer‟s ability to render effective assistance to a client may 
come from the interference by the trial judge in counsel‟s 
advocacy. A judge supervises the conduct of a trial but he is 
more than a mere umpire or moderator. A trial judge, by his 
rulings, questions, and comments, has an enormous capacity to 
affect the merits of a party‟s case and thereby influence the 
verdict of the jury.7 To be sure, the basic requirement of a trial 
judge, both legally and ethically, is to be impartial in demeanor 
as well as in actions.8 However, some judges deviate from this 
precept of neutrality, and through inadvertence or willfulness, 
 
5. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (deficient performance “requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
„counsel‟ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”). 
6. A defendant has a right to counsel of his choice. See Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“[T]he right to counsel being conceded, a 
defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own 
choice.”). Nevertheless, a judge in administering a trial has broad discretion 
to make rulings that may frustrate a defendant‟s choice of counsel. For 
example, denying a defendant the right to have an attorney appear pro hac 
vice implicates constitutional concerns, but is within a court‟s broad 
discretion to ensure competent and ethical lawyering. See United States v. 
Ries, 100 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of application of out-of-state 
attorney to appear pro hac vice is within the court‟s discretion to ensure 
competent and ethical lawyering). Similarly, no abuse of discretion is found 
when a judge denies a last-minute continuance to obtain substitute counsel. 
See United States v. Armstrong, 112 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1997). The right 
to counsel includes the right to self-representation. See Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (“In forcing [defendant], under these circumstances, 
to accept against his will a state-appointed public defender, the [trial court] 
deprived him of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense.”). 
7. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (“The influence of 
the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his 
lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove 
controlling.”) (internal citation omitted). 
8. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (“justice must satisfy 
the appearance of justice”). 
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engage in conduct that subverts a lawyer‟s ability to effectively 
defend his client. A judge has broad discretion to administer a 
trial and supervise the flow of the evidence and the conduct of 
the attorneys. However, this broad discretion does not 
authorize a judge to improperly impede defense counsel‟s 
representation in ways that destroy a defendant‟s right to a fair 
trial and the effective assistance of his attorney. When a trial 
judge improperly interferes with counsel‟s representation, to 
the extent that the defendant suffers substantial prejudice, an 
appellate court may conclude that a defendant‟s right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been violated and the 
conviction will be reversed. 
 
II. People v. Borukhova 
 
The issue of judicial interference with the right to effective 
assistance of counsel arose dramatically in a recent and highly 
publicized New York State murder trial. In People v. 
Borukhova,9 the defendant, Mazultov Borukhova, along with a 
co-defendant, Mikhail Mallayev, were convicted of shooting to 
death Borukhova‟s husband, Daniel Malakov, in a Queens 
playground in front of their four-year-old daughter. The crime 
received enormous press coverage, and the media quickly 
focused on Borukhova as a probable suspect.10 Following an 
investigation, she was charged with murder on the theory that 
she hired Mallayev to kill her husband. The evidence against 
Mallayev as the shooter was substantial; his fingerprints were 
found on a silencer discovered at the crime scene11 and he was 
 
9. No. 2009-04153 (Queens Cnty. Apr. 21, 2009). 
10. See, e.g., Nicholas Hirshon, Queens’ Most Significant Events in ’07, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 22, 2008, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/queens/2007/12/30/2007-12-
30_queens_most_significant_events_in_07.html; Tim Bukher et al., Cops 
Probe Calls of Slain Doc’s Ex-Wife, N.Y. POST, Oct. 30, 2007, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/cops_probe_calls_of_slain_doc_ex_0Iq
Mue9XDR0VD2DhfgofIJ; 
Tamer El-Ghobashy et al., Mom of Slain Dentist Certain Son’s Ex-Wife is to 
Blame, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/10/30/2007-10-
30_mom_of_slain_dentist_certain_sons_exwife.html. 
11. Transcript of Record at 2104-07, 2282, People v. Borukhova, No. 
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identified as the shooter by a witness in the playground.12 The 
case against Borukhova was weaker; she was related to 
Mallayev through marriage, was alleged to have had a motive 
to gain custody of her daughter, and had made numerous 
telephone calls to Mallayev‟s cell phone around the time of the 
shooting.13 
The trial lasted six weeks and involved several hotly 
contested evidentiary rulings that affected Borukhova‟s ability 
to present her defense intelligently.14 The rulings by the trial 
judge almost always favored the prosecution. Moreover, 
because there were grounds to believe even before the trial 
started, that the judge would favor the prosecution, the judge 
should have disqualified himself based on his close family 
connections to the Queens District Attorney‟s office.15 However, 
one critical ruling by the trial judge stands out and appears to 
have had an unusual impact on the ability of both defense 
attorneys to present their case to the jury effectively. In a 
surprise ruling at the close of testimony at 5 p.m. on March 5th, 
the last Thursday of the trial, the judge ordered both defense 
attorneys to give their closing arguments the following 
 
2009-04153 (Queens Cnty. 2009) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
12. Id. at 1651-52, 1660-63, 1665-66, 1713, 1742-43. 
13. Id. at 3630-34. 
14. Controversial evidentiary rulings included the court‟s admission of 
extensive hearsay statements, see, e.g., Brief for Appellant, app. 1113-15, 
1119-20, People v. Borukhova, No. 2009-04153 (Queens Cnty. 2009) 
[hereinafter Brief], the court‟s refusal to allow Borukhova to testify as to her 
state of mind, see, e.g., id. at 1417, 1471-72, the court‟s barring cross-
examination of police witnesses of omissions in their notes, see, e.g., id. at 
1309-14, 1316-20, 1331-34, 1337, the court‟s denial of a hearing and 
precluding cross-examination into the scientific basis for the fingerprint 
evidence, see, e.g., id. at 1146-1158, 1159-62. 
15. The trial judge‟s children held ranking positions in the Queens 
District Attorney‟s office. His son was Deputy Bureau Chief of the Career 
Criminal Major Crimes Bureau and his daughter was Deputy Bureau Chief 
of the Economic Crimes Bureau. Id. at 86. The motion to disqualify was based 
on N.Y. JUD. LAW § 14 (McKinney 1945) (prohibiting judge from presiding 
over any matter where he is “interested”), and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 22, § 100.3(E)(1), (c) (2006) (requiring disqualification in a proceeding “in 
which the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including 
matters where judge has an “interest that could be substantially affected by 
the proceeding”). 
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morning.16 In other words, after a lengthy trial with numerous 
witnesses and difficult evidentiary issues, the lawyers only had 
an overnight recess to prepare their closing arguments. By 
contrast, the judge allowed the prosecutor to give his closing 
argument the following Monday morning.17 This ruling appears 
to have taken the lawyers by surprise. It was issued after the 
judge‟s law secretary had advised defense counsel earlier that 
week that all summations would take place the following 
Monday.18 This notification followed an acrimonious debate 
between counsel and the court over whether all of the 
summations could be given on Saturday or Sunday. Moreover, 
to some observers in the courtroom, the judge‟s unexpected 
ruling appeared to mesh with remarks he made earlier in the 
trial, such as that the trial “would have to end by St. Patrick‟s 
Day, March 17th—because that was the day he was going on 
vacation.”19 As it turned out, the closing argument by 
Borukhova‟s defense counsel, as he acknowledged, was 
seriously deficient due to lack of sleep and sufficient time for 
preparation.20 And the prosecutor, as noted above, had the 
entire weekend to prepare his summation and respond to the 
defense arguments.21 
 
16. Brief, supra note 14, at 1479. 
17. Id. at 70-71, 266-67, 1456-73, 1476-79, 1480-83. 
18. Id. at 266-67, 1457-59, 1465. 
19. Janet Malcolm, Iphigenia in Forest Hills, THE NEW YORKER, May 3, 
2010, at 53 (journalist who covered trial quoted judge‟s comment before trial 
began that trial “would have to end by St. Patrick‟s Day, March 17th—
because that was the day he was going on vacation,” and quoted another 
remark allegedly made by the judge to one of the defense attorneys that 
“[t]his trial is going to be over on March 17th because I‟m going to be sipping 
piña coladas on the beach in St. Martin”). The pressure of a trial judge‟s 
vacation plans on the continuation of a trial was featured in People v. 
Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that trial judge‟s declaration 
of mistrial because the trial could not end in time for the vacation was not 
“manifestly necessary” and therefore double jeopardy protected the defendant 
from being retried on robbery and rape charges). The decision by the New 
York Court of Appeals rebuking the trial judge was criticized by the New 
York City and County Bar Associations as unfair to the judge. The Bar 
Report was subsequently criticized. See Editorial, A Disservice by the Bar, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1980, at 18. 
20. Brief, supra note 14, at 72. 
21. See, e.g., Ferrer v. State, 718 So.2d 822 (Fla. App. 1998) (violation of 
defendant‟s right to fair trial to compel defendant‟s attorney to select jury in 
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The Borukhova case describes one unusual instance in 
which a ruling by a trial judge almost certainly impaired the 
ability of defense counsel to represent his client effectively, as 
well as conferring an obviously unfair advantage on the 
prosecution. However, the Borukhova case is not unique. 
Judicial interference with counsel‟s representation, like the 
Hydra slain by Hercules, has many heads. Some of these 
interferences are idiosyncratic and defy any unifying principle. 
For example, trial judges have impaired counsel‟s ability to 
make independent decisions on how to present the defense by 
prohibiting defense counsel from making a closing argument in 
a bench trial,22 barring the defendant from giving testimony in 
his own defense,23 requiring that the defendant be the first 
witness called by the defense,24 barring direct examination of 
the defendant,25 limiting the number of witnesses that the 
defense can call,26 restricting the ability of defense counsel to 
consult with his own expert,27 limiting defense access to 
prospective witnesses,28 and imposing a time limit on 
defendant‟s direct testimony.29 The discussion that follows 
describes several broad categories of judicial interference that 
may have the effect of undermining defense counsel‟s ability to 
represent his client effectively. 
 
III. Interrogation of Witnesses 
 
One of the most common ways in which a judge can 
interfere with counsel‟s effective representation is to take over 
 
the evening when lawyer was tired and not performing at his usual level of 
competency). 
22. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 855 (1975). 
23. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 47 (1987). 
24. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 606 (1972). 
25. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 571 (1961). 
26. See United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150, 1156 (2d Cir. 1995). 
27. See People v. Santana, 600 N.E.2d 201, 202 (N.Y. 1992). 
28. See United States v. Medina, 992 F.2d 573, 579 (6th Cir. 1993), 
receded from on other grounds, United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 
369, 388 (6th Cir. 2002). 
29. See United States v. Hay, 122 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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the examination of witnesses, including both prosecution and 
defense witnesses, as well as the testimony of the defendant 
himself. A judge has the responsibility to take an active role in 
the conduct of the trial to assure that the proceedings are 
conducted in a fair, orderly, and expeditious manner. Courts 
recognize that this judicial function may include the 
questioning of witnesses in order to clarify the testimony, elicit 
necessary facts, and facilitate the orderly and efficient progress 
of the trial.30 However, given the trial judge‟s ability to 
influence the jury, the judge must be extremely careful when 
participating in the examination of a witness to avoid 
indicating through questions, tone, or demeanor that the judge 
has an opinion about the merits of the case or the credibility of 
the witness.31 Even the most conscientious and well-
intentioned judge may ask questions that, from her content, 
manner, or tone, may suggest an opinion about the case or may 
indicate an attitude with respect to the credibility of the 
witness. When analyzing whether a judge overstepped the 
limits in questioning witnesses, reviewing courts properly 
consider the necessity for asking questions, the extent of the 
interrogation, the evenhandedness in asking questions, the 
manner and tone of the questions, and whether the trial was by 
a judge or a jury. 
A judge‟s intervention may be more necessary in a lengthy 
trial involving complex issues in order to clarify testimony and 
expedite the proceedings.32 Moreover, if a witness‟s testimony 
is unresponsive or confusing, and counsel, either from 
inexperience or lack of preparation, fails to elicit clear and 
appropriate answers, it may be necessary for the judge to 
 
30. United States v. Flying By, 511 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2007) (court‟s 
questions helped clarify witness‟s testimony); United States v. Bermea, 30 
F.3d 1539, 1572 (5th Cir. 1994) (multi-defendant trial required judge‟s 
intervention to expedite trial and prevent repetition). 
31. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (“The influence of 
the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his 
lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove 
controlling.”) (internal citation omitted). 
32. Compare Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (complex and 
protracted trial), with United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(one-day trial with single issue). 
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clarify the testimony.33 Further, if a witness, because of age or 
physical or mental infirmity, has difficulty in understanding 
questions or giving clear and responsive answers, the judge 
may need to intervene to assist the witness in giving 
appropriate answers.34 However, even if a judge is justified in 
asking questions, a reviewing court will examine the extent of 
the interrogation and its evenhandedness. Appellate courts 
have actually tallied up the number of questions asked by the 
judge, the number of transcript pages covered by the judge‟s 
questions, and the numerical ratio between the judge‟s 
questions and those of counsel.35 Although the sheer number of 
questions asked by the judge may not by itself be determinative 
of the judge‟s attitude about the case, it can provide some 
insight into whether the judge may have conveyed an opinion 
about the merits of the case. Moreover, if the judge‟s 
questioning is so one-sided as to appear to favor one party, a 
reviewing court will be much more likely to find error than if 
the questioning, although extensive, was spread out equally 
among witnesses for both sides.36 
Finally, the manner and tone of the judge‟s questions are 
highly relevant considerations in determining whether the 
judge conveyed an opinion about the case or the credibility of 
the witness. Although it is difficult for a reviewing court to 
discern a judge‟s tone, mannerisms, and facial expressions from 
the “cold black and white of a printed record,”37 the types of 
questions and accompanying colloquy may provide an informed 
 
33. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985). 
34. Hickman, 592 F.2d at 933 (“It is often impossible for counsel to deal 
with a difficult witness without judicial intervention.”). 
35. United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 1996) (judge‟s 
questions during defendant‟s testimony covered twenty-five percent of 
transcript pages); People v. Yut Wai Tom, 422 N.E.2d 556, 564 (N.Y. 1981) 
(judge asked more than 1300 questions). 
36. People v. Arabadjis, 432 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (App. Div. 1980) (judge‟s 
“„slanted‟ questioning . . . unfairly buttressed the People‟s case”); Gerichten v. 
Ruiz, 435 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (App. Div. 1981) (judge‟s questions rehabilitated 
one party‟s expert and blunted testimony of other side‟s expert); United 
States v. Tilton, 714 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1983) (judge‟s intervention in 
questioning “appeared to go in both directions, affecting the defendant and 
the prosecution”). 
37. Pisani, 773 F.2d at 402 (internal citation omitted). 
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basis for an appellate court to infer that a particular tone or 
manner was expressed by the judge. Thus, appellate courts 
have found that a judge‟s questions to witnesses displayed 
ridicule,38 “hostility,”39 “disbelief,”40 “skepticism,”41 
incredulity,42 argumentativeness,43 “inquisition,”44 “zeal,”45 
sarcasm,46 slant,47 and aggressiveness.48 By the same token, at 
least one appellate court has also noted a trial judge‟s 
benevolent disposition towards a witness, interpreting the 
judge‟s tone and manner as protective, reassuring, and 
reinforcing.49 
A good example of a judge‟s improper intrusion in 
questioning a witness is People v. Ellis,50 a New York State 
murder trial in which the appellate court observed that 
“[t]hroughout the trial, the court assumed the function of the 
prosecutor to such an extent as to deprive defendant of a fair 
trial and to impair the aura of impartiality which should 
surround every judicial proceeding.”51 During his direct 
testimony, the defendant denied acknowledging to the police 
that he owned a particular hat found by the arresting officer 
that was critical to the identity of the killer.52 The trial court 
interrupted defense counsel‟s examination and, by skillful 
questions, transparent sarcasm, and ridicule, all but destroyed 
 
38. Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1073 (7th Cir. 1985). 
39. United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1970). 
40. United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F.3d 415, 420 (8th Cir. 1994). 
41. United States v. Mazzilli, 848 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1988). 
42. People v. Tucker, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (App. Div. 1982). 
43. United States v. Lanham, 416 F.2d 1140, 1141 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969). 
44. Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 1956). 
45. United States v. Hoker, 483 F.2d 359, 366 n.10 (5th Cir. 1973). 
46. Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 1985). 
47. People v. Arabadjis, 432 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (App. Div. 1980). 
48. Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 
742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983). 
49. Id. at 1382, 1384 (judge‟s “protective and reassuring attitude toward 
the prosecution witnesses” and “coming quickly to the aid of prosecution 
witnesses during cross-examination”). 
50. 404 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 1978). 
51. Id. at 864. 
52. Id. at 863-64. 
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the defendant‟s credibility.53 Further, in an obvious effort to 
blunt the effectiveness of defense counsel‟s cross-examination 
of the prosecutor‟s key witness, who testified that he pleaded 
guilty to a lesser crime in exchange for his testimony, the trial 
judge again interrupted defense counsel‟s questioning with the 
rhetorical question: “Ninety percent of those sitting in prison, 
were they allowed to plead to a lesser crime than that for which 
they were indicted, as far as you know?”54 
A judge‟s participation in questioning may not only 
damage a defendant‟s credibility, as in People v. Ellis, but may 
also enhance the credibility of a prosecution witness, thereby 
impliedly endorsing the prosecution‟s case and subverting the 
defendant‟s case. Such conduct obviously is objectionable 
because it suggests to the jury that the judge is not impartial 
but holds a favorable view of the government‟s case. A judge 
can undermine a defense counsel‟s cross-examination of a 
government witness by questions that either rehabilitate the 
witness55 or blunt a prosecution witness‟s testimony that 
appeared to support the defense.56 Moreover, whereas a lawyer 
is not permitted to express an opinion about the credibility of a 
witness,57 it is even more egregious for a judge to do so because 
such conduct adds considerable influence to the jury‟s 
evaluation of the evidence. Thus, judges have disparaged the 
 
53. Id. at 864. 
54. Id. (internal citation omitted). For other prejudicial interventions, 
see People v. De Jesus, 369 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1977) (judge accused defense 
counsel of playing “games” and “putting words in . . . (the witness‟) mouth” 
(internal citation omitted)); People v. Eldridge, 542 N.Y.S.2d 65 (App. Div. 
1989) (judge forced defendant to characterize prosecution witnesses as 
“liars”); People v. Connor, 524 N.Y.S.2d 287 (App. Div. 1988) (judge 
gratuitously advised jury that defendant was attempting to delay his trial); 
People v. Iskandar, 426 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1980) (judge insinuated that 
defendant committed crime). 
55. United States v. Barnhart, 599 F.3d 737, 745 (7th Cir. 2010) (judge‟s 
“attempt to bolster the prosecution‟s witness took the wind out of the sails of 
the defense attorney‟s cross-examination”). 
56. United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1996) (judge‟s 
follow-up questions demolished helpful concession made by prosecution 
witness). 
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2010) (duty of attorney 
not to “state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of 
a witness, . . . or the guilt or innocence of an accused”). 
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credibility of witnesses with outrageous remarks,58 made 
gratuitous remarks that favor the prosecution,59 made 
comments that have endorsed the prosecutor‟s high moral 
character thereby manipulating the jury‟s sympathies for the 
government,60 and have made snide and belittling comments to 
defense witnesses.61  
 
IV. Mistreatment of Counsel 
 
A judge‟s criticism and abuse of defense counsel may be so 
pronounced as to impair counsel‟s ability to effectively defend 
his client. Trial judges should display patience, courtesy, and 
respect toward counsel so as not to prejudice the jury by giving 
an impression of the court‟s partisanship. However, judges are 
only human; the pressures of a trial, or the conduct of defense 
counsel, may cause even the most mild-tempered judge to vent 
irritation or impatience. Although any disparaging comments 
to defense counsel ideally should be suppressed, and certainly 
should not be made in the jury‟s presence, some remarks may 
be so intense and so frequent that they may unnerve and 
demoralize counsel, impair his ability to function effectively, 
and prejudice the jury against him. 
A judge‟s remarks that impugn a lawyer‟s integrity are a 
striking example of misconduct that often results in the 
reversal of a conviction. For example, one judge admonished 
defense counsel in front of the jury: “I won‟t let you tell them 
rotten law.”62 Another judge interrupted counsel‟s summation 
 
58. Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (judge 
ridiculed defendant‟s colloquial expression of young people as “dudes”), aff’d, 
742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983). 
59. People v. Sprinkle, 189 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ill. 1963) (before leading 
elderly robbery victim into making courtroom identification of the defendant, 
judge remarked “God bless you,” and later “I think you are marvelous”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
60. United States v. Assi, 748 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring to 
prosecutor as “the distinguished Assistant United States Attorney who‟s been 
handling this case before us”) (internal ciation omitted). 
61. Such remarks may be the basis for disciplinary action. See, e.g., In re 
Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1985); In re Waltemade, 409 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Ct. 
Jud. 1975); In re Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. 1989). 
62. United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1979) 
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to advise the jury that counsel‟s assertion was “absurd and 
bordering upon a lie,” and that counsel “won‟t get away with 
it.”63 As the appellate court noted, “the court‟s castigation of 
counsel so discredited him in the eyes of the jury that he could 
not have remained an effective spokesman for his client.”64 
Another judge, in the presence of the jury, accused counsel of 
“sandbagging” conduct and remarked, “I think the jury and I 
are entitled to know why.”65 Equally reprehensible are a judge‟s 
remarks accusing counsel of throwing up “a smoke screen,”66 
“pull[ing] a filibuster,”67 playing games,68 and “putting words in 
. . . (the witness‟) mouth.”69 
A judge‟s remarks may also impugn counsel‟s competence. 
Although a judge occasionally may find it necessary to 
admonish counsel to ask proper questions, not to be repetitive, 
and to adhere to proper rules of courtroom decorum, such 
remarks, as well as any corrective action, should be made 
outside the presence of the jury. Gratuitous reproaches about 
counsel‟s ineptness in the presence of the jury can throw 
counsel off balance and impair his effectiveness. Disparaging 
remarks made by the judge in the jury‟s presence, such as: “I 
haven‟t any right in a public trial to give [the attorney] a course 
in evidence,”70 “[y]ou will have to see a lawyer, . . . if you don‟t 
understand [my ruling],”71 and “I don‟t know about a defense, 
but you are doing some conducting,”72 “[y]our tactics are not 
 
(internal citation omitted). 
63. United States v. Spears, 558 F.2d 1296, 1297 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(internal ciation omitted). 
64. Id. at 1298. 
65. Spencer v. State, 543 A.2d 851, 854 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) 
(internal citation omitted). 
66. United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1088 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(internal citation omitted). 
67. State v. Hammler, 312 So.2d 306, 314 (La. 1975) (internal citation 
omitted). 
68. People v. De Jesus, 369 N.E.2d 752, 754 (N.Y. 1977). 
69. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
70. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 388 n.84 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(internal citation omitted). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 387 n.83. 
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correct,”73 and to “sit down and let the other attorney take over 
if you don‟t know how to cross examine this man”74 are 
offensive and frequently reversible error. Rebuking comments 
that include sarcasm, ridicule, and personal humiliation often 
lead to reversal.75 Harsh rebukes, even outside the jury‟s 
presence, such as accusing counsel of “disgusting and shyster-
like” behavior, can create an “embattled and prejudicial 
atmosphere in the courtroom that makes a fair trial 
impossible.”76 
Finally, threatening counsel with disciplinary sanctions in 
the presence of the jury is serious misconduct that can 
undercut counsel‟s effectiveness and deprive a defendant of a 
fair trial.77 Such threats might intimidate a lawyer to temper 
his zealous defense of his client, and thereby undercut his 
effectiveness, as well as suggest to a jury that the lawyer is 
behaving unethically and thereby prejudice the jury against 
the lawyer. Even threats made outside the jury‟s presence can 
result in a deprivation of the right to counsel, as when a judge 
chastised a court-appointed lawyer for ingratitude and “made a 
thinly veiled threat not to approve [counsel‟s] fee request at the 
end of the trial.”78 Obviously, such threats have the likelihood 
of hampering the lawyer‟s aggressive conduct in order to curry 
favor with the judge. 
 
V. Interfering With Attorney-Client Consultation 
 
Another way that a judge can undermine a defendant‟s 
right to counsel is by interfering with his ability to consult with 
his attorney during the trial. A judge‟s order barring such 
 
73. Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir. 1968) (internal 
citation omitted). 
74. Id. 
75. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing 
judge‟s “unnecessary barbs” at counsel, which were made with “distressing 
frequency”); People v. Johns, 415 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 1979) (noting court‟s 
antagonistic and disparaging attitude toward counsel). 
76. United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1973) (internal 
citation omitted). 
77. United States v. Kastenbaum, 613 F.2d 86, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1980). 
78. Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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consultation often occurs when a defendant is on the witness 
stand. The justification for such a non-consultation order does 
not rest on the assumption that defense counsel will engage in 
unethical coaching; rather, such orders are justified on the 
theory that when a defendant becomes a witness, he has no 
constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is 
testifying.79 However, in the leading case of Geders v. United 
States,80 the Supreme Court ruled a trial judge‟s order directing 
the defendant not to consult with his attorney during an 
overnight recess, called while the defendant was on the witness 
stand, violated the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that normal 
consultation between a lawyer and his client during an 
overnight recess would ordinarily embrace matters that go well 
beyond the defendant‟s own testimony, such as the availability 
of other witnesses, trial tactics, and the possibility of a plea 
bargain, but the judge‟s order effectively barred discussion of 
all of these matters.81 The judge‟s order easily could have been 
framed to limit discussion with respect to the defendant‟s 
testimony only. Moreover, denial of a brief recess during the 
trial to permit counsel to confer with his client over whether 
the defendant should take the stand constituted an abuse of 
discretion; such a brief recess would not obstruct orderly trial 
procedure.82 
Courts reviewing the permissibility of orders barring a 
defendant‟s ability to consult with his attorney during other 
trial recesses, such as weekends, luncheon recesses, and 
recesses during the trial day, usually make a distinction 
between lengthy and brief recesses.83 For example, in Perry v. 
Leeke,84 the Supreme Court limited Geders, holding that an 
order directing the defendant not to consult with his attorney 
 
79. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281 (1989). 
80. 425 U.S. 80 (1976). 
81. Id. 
82. See People v. Spears, 474 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 1984). 
83. Compare People v. Joseph, 646 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1994) (error to bar 
communication during weekend recess), with People v. Enrique, 600 N.E.2d 
229 (N.Y. 1992) (no error to ban consultation during luncheon recess called 
during cross-examination of defendant). 
84. 488 U.S. 272 (1989). 
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during a fifteen-minute recess declared after the defendant 
completed his direct examination did not violate the 
defendant‟s right to counsel. As the Court observed: “[W]hen a 
defendant becomes a witness, he has no constitutional right to 
consult with his lawyer while he is testifying.”85 Even during a 
short recess, a judge could permit a defendant to consult with 
his attorney about trial issues generally, but bar discussion 
concerning his ongoing testimony.86 
A judge‟s interference with consultation may take other 
forms, such as requiring that the defendant communicate with 
his lawyer only in writing while court is in session.87 Non-
consultation orders may also include orders barring defense 
consultation with prospective witnesses. In one New York case, 
People v. Santana,88 the trial court barred defense counsel from 
discussing the testimony of the prosecution‟s expert with his 
own expert until after the prosecution‟s expert completed his 
testimony. This unusual ruling, according to the New York 
Court of Appeals, presented defense counsel with a Hobson‟s 
choice—either he could consult with his own expert and forgo 
calling his expert as his witness, or refrain from consultation 
and be free to call him in rebuttal.89 In reversing, the Court of 
Appeals found that the prejudice to defense counsel‟s ability to 
effectively defend his client was incalculable.90 
 
VI. Refusal to Grant a Recess or Continuance 
 
A judge‟s refusal to grant a recess or continuance may also 
impair a lawyer‟s ability to represent a client effectively. 
Ordinarily, the decision to grant or deny a recess or 
continuance lies within a judge‟s broad discretion to administer 
the trial, and such decisions constitute error only when there is 
 
85. Id. at 281. 
86. People v. Stroner, 432 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
87. Moore v. Purkett, 275 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding this practice 
to be a violation of the defendant‟s rights). 
88. 600 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1992). 
89. Id. at 204. 
90. Id. at 205. 
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a clear abuse of discretion.91 As a general rule, a trial judge‟s 
unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expedition in the 
face of a reasonable and good faith request for an adjournment 
usually constitutes an abuse of discretion.92 The most critical 
factor bearing on whether the denial of a request for a 
continuance constitutes error is whether the defendant 
suffered prejudice.93 Without establishing how the denial 
impacted the defendant‟s ability to prove his case, the ruling 
denying an adjournment probably will be sustained.94 
Although a judge should not tolerate chronic 
procrastination and irresponsibility on the part of a lawyer, 
requests for continuances are often made in good faith and not 
for lack of due diligence. For example, where a defendant 
charged with drug crimes sought a continuance after a co-
defendant changed his story fifteen hours before trial to 
implicate the defendant in two prior drug transactions, the 
judge‟s denial of a continuance was a clear abuse of 
discretion.95 The change in the co-defendant‟s testimony was 
unforeseen and defense counsel had virtually no time to 
prepare for it.96 Moreover, the dramatic change in testimony 
conflicted sharply with the witness‟s prior statements, which 
portrayed the defendant as a reluctant participant.97 In other 
contexts, the denial of a request for an adjournment based on 
the illness of a party, witness, or counsel may be an abuse of 
discretion when the request is made in good faith and there is a 
showing that prejudice will result from a denial.98 Moreover, 
when a fundamental right is involved, such as securing the 
attendance of a material witness,99 obtaining new counsel,100 or 
 
91. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); United States v. Edwards, 
101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1996). 
92. United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 545 (1st Cir. 1991). 
93. See id. 
94. United States v. Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1984). 
95. United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 882-83 (7th Cir. 2009). 
96. Id. at 882. 
97. Id. at 883. 
98. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
99. Pazden v. Maurer, 424 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2005) (denial of continuance 
in a complex fraud trial to allow defense counsel to adequately prepare and 
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permitting the attorney to consult with his client over whether 
the defendant should testify,101 a judge‟s refusal to grant a brief 
delay may be an abuse of discretion, and a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment and the right to a fair trial. 
When delays are requested to secure the attendance of 
witnesses, counsel must demonstrate both that he made a good 
faith effort to secure the witness‟s attendance prior to 
requesting the adjournment, and that the witness would 
provide favorable and material evidence.102 When a defendant 
has been given ample opportunity to protect his interests, such 
as having already been granted several adjournments, the 
refusal of a judge to further accommodate counsel ordinarily 
will be upheld.103 Similarly, when a request is made for an 
adjournment to secure new counsel, or to give present counsel 
more time to prepare, the decision to grant or deny the request 
will be evaluated in light of the reasons for the request, the 
good faith and diligence of the party, and the resulting 
prejudice from the refusal of the judge to accede to the 
request.104 Finally, as noted above, denying a request for a 
continuance because defense counsel was surprised by 
unexpected evidence is improper only when the lawyer can 





interview 560 witnesses, especially in light of the government‟s dilatory 
compliance with discovery obligations, violated defendant‟s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel); People v. Walker, 813 N.Y.S.2d 600 (App. Div. 
2006) (denial of request for a forty-five minute recess to produce an alibi 
witness deprived defendant of fundamental right to defend himself). 
100. United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2000) (arbitrary 
denial of continuance to retain counsel of choice violated Sixth Amendment). 
101. People v. Spears, 474 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 1984). 
102. Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618, 623 (2d Cir. 1978); People v. 
Belotti, 563 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App. Div. 1990). 
103. United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560 (1st Cir. 1996); People v. 
Singleton, 361 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y. 1977). 
104. Bland v. Cal. Dep‟t of Corrs., 20 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial of 
continuance to substitute new counsel was an abuse of discretion and 
violation of Sixth Amendment). 
105. United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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VII.  Restrictions on Counsel‟s Summation 
 
Judicial interference with effective representation may 
also occur, as in the Borukhova case, when a judge imposes 
unwarranted and burdensome restrictions on counsel‟s 
summation. Such interference most often occurs when the 
judge imposes time limits on the attorney‟s summation. 
Although a judge has an obligation to use judicial time 
efficiently, an undue emphasis on speed can deprive a 
defendant of a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel. 
Imposing unreasonable time constraints on counsel‟s closing 
argument can be an abuse of discretion, as well as an 
infringement on defendant‟s right to counsel, when the court‟s 
order prevents competent counsel from having sufficient time 
to fully and completely present her defense to the jury and 
develop plausible legal arguments supported by the facts. 
Factors bearing on the appropriateness of the trial judge‟s time 
limitations are the length and complexity of the trial, the 
number of defendants, the number of witnesses, and the 
potential punishment. Thus, a thirty-minute limitation in a 
murder case was found to be unreasonable,106 as was a one-
hour limitation in a capital murder trial.107 However, when 
potentially complex issues are not seriously disputed, or do not 
require elaborate presentation, it is less likely that an abuse of 
discretion will be found.108 
In addition to time constraints, abuse of discretion has 
been found from a trial court‟s restrictions on jury argument in 
the following: disallowing counsel to argue proper inferences 
from the evidence,109 refusing to allow counsel to argue points 
of law that are included in the judge‟s charge,110 refusing to 
 
106. Stockton v. State, 544 So.2d 1006 (Fla. 1989). 
107. Collier v. State, 705 P.2d 1126 (Nev. 1985). 
108. See United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 1995). 
109. United States v. Tory, 52 F.3d 207, 211 (9th Cir. 1995). 
110. United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 401 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated 
on other grounds by Hunter v. United States, 559 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 
2009) (court determined that carrying a concealed weapon is not a violent 
felony and also is not a crime of violence pursuant to the Sentencing 
Guidelines). 
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allow more than one counsel to address the jury,111 refusing to 
allow counsel to reserve his opening argument until the 
prosecution has completed its case,112 and forcing defense 
counsel to complete his closing argument before a recess as a 
sanction for purportedly delaying the trial.113 
 
VIII. Restrictive Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Evidentiary rulings may be the most pivotal events in a 
trial. A trial judge enjoys considerable discretion in ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence. When a trial court abuses its 
discretion, error is committed, and, if sufficiently harmful, may 
result in reversal of a conviction. Rulings on evidence naturally 
will affect the ability of counsel to represent his client 
effectively, but such rulings are the types of routine trial events 
that ordinarily do not raise issues of ineffectiveness. However, 
evidentiary rulings that exclude critical defense evidence are 
usually reviewed more closely than rulings that admit relevant 
prosecution evidence, and such exclusionary rulings may 
implicate Sixth Amendment concerns.114 This is particularly so 
with respect to rulings that exclude relevant scientific or other 
technical defense proof.115 Thus, excluding psychiatric 
testimony when a defendant‟s mental state is a crucial issue 
obviously impairs effective representation,116 and may be an 
abuse of discretion. A judge‟s exclusion of testimony on the 
issue of identification may create the same problem.117 
Moreover, discretion in making evidentiary rulings must be 
applied evenhandedly. Thus, a judge‟s exclusion of an expert‟s 
testimony for the defense while allowing an expert‟s testimony 
 
111. State v. Mitchell, 365 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. 1988). 
112. United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979). 
113. United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976). 
114. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (application of state 
evidence rule that denied defendant the ability to present crucial testimony 
violated due process). 
115. United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversible 
error to exclude expert‟s psychological testimony that defendant had 
difficulties with visual perception). 
116. United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1986). 
117. Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1979). 
2011] EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 579 
 
for the prosecution on the same issue is an abuse of 
discretion.118 
The imposition of sanctions against the defense for 
violating discovery rules also may seriously impede effective 
representation. Thus, in Taylor v. Illinois,119 the Supreme 
Court ruled that a judge‟s preclusion of defense testimony of an 
alibi witness as a sanction for the attorney‟s discovery violation 
did not violate the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process, especially since the violation appeared to 
be willful and the proffered evidence may have been perjury. 
Courts relying on Taylor to exclude defense evidence have 
emphasized that the discovery violation was deliberate,120 
involved dilatory tactics,121 related to evidence whose probative 
value was minimal,122 or evinced conduct prejudicial to the 
judicial process.123 Although such rulings can severely 
prejudice the defendant by depriving him of critical evidence, 
appellate courts routinely allow the trial judge wide latitude in 
policing discovery violations and find error only when the 
discretion is abused.124 
A judge also burdens effective representation when he 
makes rulings that deprive a defendant of the basic tools 
necessary to conduct an adequate defense. Transcripts of 
earlier proceedings are a vital tool for conducting an effective 
defense.125 As is the assistance of experts or investigators 
provided to an indigent defendant at the government‟s 
expense.126 Thus, for example, when the assistance of an expert 
 
118. United States v. Sellers, 566 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1977). 
119. 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
120. Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1993). 
121. Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995). 
122. Guam v. Palomo, 35 F.3d 368, 374 (9th Cir. 1994). 
123. United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
124. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (preclusion of 
relevant evidence as sanction for discovery violation violated defendant‟s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Commonwealth v. Dranka, 702 N.E.2d 
1192 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (abuse of discretion to preclude testimony of 
defense expert based on defense counsel‟s untimely disclosure of witness‟s 
identity). 
125. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971); People v. Coleman, 
611 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1993). 
126. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
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will be crucial to a defendant‟s ability to present his defense, 
and when a proper showing has been made, a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to such assistance.127 A defendant has 
the burden of establishing with reasonable particularity the 
necessity for such assistance, and the court‟s determination is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.128 
 
IX. Restricting Cross-Examination 
 
The Sixth Amendment‟s Confrontation Clause guarantees 
a defendant the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.129 
However, the right of cross-examination, whether analyzed as 
a constitutional or evidentiary matter, is not absolute. As a 
constitutional matter, a judge must afford defense counsel “a 
reasonable chance to develop the whole picture.”130 Assuming 
constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a judge is afforded 
broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on cross-
examination based on concerns of harassment, prejudice, 
confusion of issues, witness safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant.131 As the Supreme Court 
has observed, counsel must be allowed “an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is 
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish.”132 However, although a judge has broad discretion 
to regulate cross-examination, when the judge curtails 
questioning into important and relevant facts bearing on the 
trustworthiness of crucial testimony, such interference may 
deprive a defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. 
One of the most important objectives of cross-examination 
 
127. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (finding 
refusal to appoint ballistics and fingerprint experts based on a general 
statement of request did not violate defendant‟s rights); Castro v. Ward, 138 
F.3d 810, 826-27 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of investigative 
assistance based on defendant‟s failure to show the necessity of an 
investigator for an adequate defense). 
128. United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994). 
129. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974). 
130. United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1996). 
131. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 
132. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). 
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is the opportunity of counsel to probe a witness‟s motivation for 
testifying, including possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior 
motives.133 A judge‟s prohibition or substantial curtailment of 
cross-examination into facts indicative of a witness‟s bias is 
likely to be a constitutional error. Thus, in Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall,134 it was held constitutionally impermissible for the 
trial judge to bar all cross-examination of a prosecution witness 
about a prior criminal charge that had been dismissed by the 
government in an effort to obtain the witness‟s cooperation and 
testimony. Similarly, in Davis v. Alaska,135 it was 
constitutional error for the trial judge to bar defense counsel 
from cross-examining the government‟s principal witness as to 
the reason for his cooperation. However, a judge acts within his 
discretion when he limits cross-examination that is 
cumulative,136 repetitive,137 of marginal relevance,138 
harassing,139 or otherwise improper.140 Assessing the 
seriousness of the restriction, the reviewing judge should 
consider factors such as the importance of the witness‟s 
testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
existence of contradictory evidence on material points, the 
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the 
strength of the evidence against the defendant.141 When a judge 
does afford counsel some latitude in exploring issues germane 
to the case, it probably cannot be said that the judge interfered 




 A lawyer‟s ineffective representation of a client may be 
attributable to a lawyer‟s own personal failings. However, 
 
133. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). 
134. 475 U.S. 673. 
135. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
136. United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
137. United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1996). 
138. United States v. Ragland, 555 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2009). 
139. United States v. McCarty, 82 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1996). 
140. United States v. Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, 1206 (7th Cir. 1994). 
141. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
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impairment of the right to effective assistance of counsel may 
also come from a trial judge‟s conduct, and can take many 
forms and occur in varying circumstances. It is therefore 
difficult to formulate clear principles to cover all of the various 
situations in which a judge can undermine effective 
representation. The Borukhova case is only the most recent 
illustration of the way a ruling of a judge—forcing the lawyer 
to sum up his case without giving the lawyer adequate time for 
preparation—may deprive the defendant of the effective 
representation by his attorney. 
The discussion in this Article of the various types of 
conduct and rulings that a trial judge may make that impede 
effective advocacy is not intended to suggest that there may not 
be other examples of judicial interference. Trial judges have 
extremely broad discretion to administer the trial, but must do 
so impartially and with deference to a defendant‟s right to the 
competent assistance of his attorney. When a judge makes 
rulings that: (1) undermine counsel‟s effectiveness and ability 
to be the guiding hand to his client that the Sixth Amendment 
contemplates; (2) have no clear justification for the judge‟s 
intervention; or (3) cause the defendant to suffer prejudice from 
the judge‟s interference, then a reviewing court usually will 
reverse the conviction and conclude that the judge abused his 
discretion and infringed on the defendant‟s right to a fair trial 
and the effective assistance of his counsel. 
 
